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No. 6194 
In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
E. L. ALLEX, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LE\\""IS Y. TRrE~L\.X, Judge of the 
Second Judicial Di~trict of the State 
of U t a h; JOSEPH HOLBROOl(, 
Sheriff of Daris County, r t a h; 
CALVIN G. ROBERTS, Deputy 
Sheriff of Davis County, State of "Ctah; 
David F. Smith, Commissioner of 
Agriculture of the State of "Ctah; and 
C. G. McCULLOrGH, Deputy In-
·spector of the Utah State Commission 
of Agriculture, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
IRVINE, SKEEN, THURMAN & MINER, 
Attornevs for Plaintiff 
-. -'4;'- • . - •.... ' 
--) ~ J. ~a, 
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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
E. L. ALLEN, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEWIS V. TRUEMAN, Judge of the 
Second Judicial District of the State 
of U t a h; JOSEPH HOLBROOK, 
·Sheriff o f Davis County, Utah; 
CALVIN G. ROBERTS, Deputy 
Sheriff of Davis County, State of Utah; 
David F. Smith, Commissioner of 
Agriculture of the State of Utah ; and 
C. G. McCULLOUGH, Deputy In-
'Speclor of the Utah State Commission 
of Agriculture, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
Because -of the fact that the defendants take up 
the major portion of their brief in arguing on 
matters that are not before the Court and could not 
possibly be considered by this Court in this pro-
ceeding, and because we feel that it is necessary 
to point these matters out to the Court to prevent 
a misunderstanding as to the issues involved and 
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the relief sought by this proceeding, plaintiff feels 
it necessary to submit this reply brief. 
We will briefly refer to a few of the points of 
~iiscussion and a few of the instances where de-
fendants have argued entirely beside the point. 
On page 2 of defendants' brief, counsel refers 
to the United Statt_•s Public. Health Ordinance rela-
tive to milk, and states that numerous dairies named 
in the brief have complied with such ordinance. 
;r_rhe plaintiff v;rill submit the product he sells for 
comparison with that sold by other dairies if coun-
sel wishes, but we would like to remind counsel that 
this proceeding has nothing whatever to do with 
the quality of any product sold, but merely the ques-
tion of containers in which milk products are sold, 
and whether search and seizure should be available 
to individuals for the recovery of the possession of 
those containers which the dairies have delivered 
out of their own possession. 
On page 4 of defendants' brief, counsel states 
that the services of the Bottle Exchange are avail-
able to plaintiff. 'V e reply: yes, they are available 
to plaintiff if, but only if, plaintiff is willing to give 
everything a.nJ receive nothing in return. Counsel 
then goes on to mention the bottle costs to the milk 
industry, a large part of which is due to "theft and 
wrongfull abstraction" etc. If counsel means to 
infer that plaintiff came into possession of any bot-
tles wrongfully, let him or anyone else so charge 
and prove in a proper manner rather than to make 
such inferences in this proceeding in an attempt to 
becloud the main issues, or in an attempt to raise 
~· prejudice in the minds of the members of this 
Honorable Court. The possession of bottles which 
the plaintiff may now have or may have had in the 
past is no more wrongful than the very Bottle Ex· 
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3 
change fostered and maintained by the very dairies 
whom counsel for the defendm1ts represents, but 
that is wholly beside tlte point in this proceeding. 
On page 16 of his brief, counsel states as his 
first proposition on which he argues in the brief, the 
question "has the plaintiff any right in law to use 
the trade-1narked bottles of other dairies in the op-
eration of his crt:'am station ·t '' The very reason 
why plaintiff asks for the writ of prohibition is be-
cause the District Court at Farmington was pro-
ceeding and threatening· to proceed to determine 
'Whether plaintiff had the right to possession- not 
the right to use, these bottles, and plaintiff 
contends that that question being merely and ad-
judication of a civil right, -was improper in a crim-
inal proceeding of search and seizure, and plain-
tiff asks this Court to prohibit the District Court 
from proceeding to determine that civil right in a 
criminal action or quasi-criminal action upon search 
and seizure. Clearly, the plaintiff could not ask 
this Court to prohibit the District Court from pro~ 
ceeding to determine that civil question and then 
either the plaintiff or defendants turn around and 
ask this Court to determine that same question upon 
these prohibition proceedings . 
Again, on page 12, counRel states ''so . . . . 
the first question to be determined . . . is whether 
or not plaintiff . . . acquires any interest whatso-
ever in and to the trade-marked bottles . . . . '' 
Counsel either does not see the point, or does not 
care to meet the issue squarely, or is attempting to 
drag a herring across the trail, or lay a smoke-
screen in an attempt to obscure the real issues upon 
which this proceeding is based. 
The plaintiff would welcome litigation in a 
proper plenary suit upon the question as to whether 
1 Ill 
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under the practice of dairies in the Salt Lake area, 
lhe mode of acquiring possession of these bottles 
does or does not give an interest in this property to 
the plaintiff. We would further welcome litigation 
upon the question as to whether plaintiff's products 
are inferior or superior, or whether plaintiff has 
been, by the use of such bottles, misleading the pub-
lic. As a matter of fact, plaintiff is proud of the 
products he sells, and defendants know that they 
have no basis for any charge of fraud, misbranding 
or misleading the public with respect to such pro-
ducts. 
On pages 14 and 15, counsel attempts to incite 
sympathy by pointing out the hardship that would 
come to various dairies if they were compelled to 
resort to replevin. The various dairies can't afford 
the maintenance of a proper action in replevin 
where they would have to put up a bond before they 
could repossess personal property, so they want 
the State to assume that burden for them, and the 
only way the State can do so is to make it a crim-
inal proceeding. Even so, they are willing to go to 
that length to get the State to assume their burden 
rather than to apply the remedy they have in their 
own hands and under their own control, viz., mak-
ing the customers contract for the return of these 
bottles and making' them responsible for them if 
they don't return the bottles, which, in spite of the 
suggestion of Justice Thurman in the Clover Leaf 
Dairy v. Van Gerven case, they have ·wholly ~efused 
to do, counsel's statements on page 5 of his brief 
to the contrar~r notwith~tandinr:. 
The majority of counsel's brief is used up in 
arguing that plaintiff has no interest in these bot-
ties, that he has no right to use and no right to re-
fill them, and may not have complied with inspec-
tion standards or have as high quality milk as other 
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dairies, and mio·ht be r>nilty of unfair competition 
in the use of b~ands; ~nigl;t even be classed as a 
felon or malefactor, ns counsel infers on page 25 
of his brid. All of thi~ might be interesting if 
true, and plaintiff is willing to meet sueh charges 
whenever he may be called upon properly to do so~ 
but we must remind counsel that all of t11is is im-
material in this proceeding and does not even 
necessitate the denial which plaintiff could easily 
substantiate. 
We must repeat again and point out to counsel 
the main question at issue in this case, Yiz. the right 
to ·use the criminal .authorities of the State and the 
criminal prucedure of search aud seizure for the 
maintenance of a mere prh·afe right, i.e. the re-
corery of the mere possession of a limited species 
of personal property. 
The plaintiff and any other citizen similarly 
situated should have the right to try all of the 
questions posed by counsel in his brief, in a proper 
civil action where he would not be classed as a 
felon and malefactor at the outset, and where other 
individuals who would claim the right to possession 
of property before trial, would be compelled to put 
up a bond to guarantee that plaintiff would not 
be compelled to seek redress from the State - a 
disinterested party - if property is wrongfully 
taken before such hearing is had. 
Even the cases cited by counsel that do have 
some bearing upon the question at issue in this 
case - the question of search and seizure or the 
constitutionality of this statute - do not refer to 
cases where search and seizure was involved. 
The case- of Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police 
Court, cited on page 26 of counsel's brief, had ref-
erence to a statute making it incumbent on a person 
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finding or receiving a container with a registered 
brand, to 1nake diligent effort to find the owner. 
No question of search and seizure for the recovery 
of that property was involved, and the case can-
not be in point either upon the proceeding here, 
nor as changing the rule set forth in the cases cited 
in plaintiff's original brief, and we respectfully 
refer the Court to the cases in plaintiff's original 
brief, none of which have been answered in any way 
by the defendants. 
Counsel even compares the milk industry to a 
public utility on the closing page of his brief. We 
do not believe that the State has yet gone so far as to 
either prosecute or defend in its own name actions 
involving civil rights of any public utility with re-
spect to its personal property. We believe that even 
a public utility must resort to the civil courts in an 
action of replevin if it wishes to recover personal 
property claimed by it from the possession of third 
parties and in such an action even a public utility 
would be compelled to put up a bond if it claimed 
recovery of possession of such personal property 
prior to a civil trial and prior to a judgment on 
the merits .. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the writ of 
prohibition should be made permanent. 
IRVINE, SKEEN, THURMAN & MINER, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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